



(*) This text is based on the dissertation conducted by Claudia Andrea Reyes Quilodran, entitled "The 
main factors that could determine the behavior of a torturer" (2009), submitted at the Washington 
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Abstract 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Latin American countries experienced military coups 
and military interventions in government affairs. In Chile, the military coup of 1973 established a 
military regime that lasted seventeen years, from 1973 to 1990. As a result of the military 
dictatorship thousands of people were killed, disappeared and/or tortured. This study examines the 
influence of the institutional framework on the occurrence of torture and the behavior of torturers. 
Perpetrators of torture are the main source of information. Depth interviews were conducted with 
Chilean military and policemen who were active during the military regime, National Reports and 
judicial files were analyzed. The study traces the realities that a group within in the military regime 
faced and examines the ways in which participants attempted to cope with the criminal behavior that 





A fines de los años sesenta y principios de los setenta, la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos 
sufrieron golpes de Estado e intervenciones militares en asuntos gubernamentales. En Chile, el golpe 
militar de 1973 estableció un régimen militar que duró diecisiete años, de 1973 a 1990. Como 
resultado de la dictadura militar, miles de personas murieron, desaparecieron y/o fueron torturadas. 
Este estudio examina la influencia del marco institucional sobre la ocurrencia de torturas y el 
comportamiento de los torturadores. Los autores de torturas son la principal fuente de información. 
Se realizaron entrevistas en profundidad con militares chilenos y policías que estuvieron activos 
durante el régimen militar, se analizaron informes nacionales y expedientes judiciales. El estudio 
analiza las realidades  que enfrentó un grupo de individuos durante el régimen militar y examina las 
formas en que los participantes intentaron manejar  el comportamiento criminal mientras eran 




KW.- Torturer behavior, criminal behavior, police, militarized intuitions, torture 





One of the worst consequences of the Latin American military regimes was a considerable 
amount of human rights violations (Cottam, 1994; National Commission on Disappeared 
People, 1986; Amnesty International, 1984; Rettig et al, 1991; Servicio Paz y Justicia, 
1989; Valech, et al, 2004). In Chile, the military coup of 1973 established a military 
regime that lasted seventeen years, from 1973 to 1990. As a result of the military 
dictatorship, 1,322 people were killed, and 957 people disappeared (Rettig et al, 1991). In 
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addition, approximately 27,255 people were tortured (Valech, et al, 2004). To prevent 
torture, we must know the role of State institutions in perpetrating torture. Based on these 
facts, this study examines how the Chilean army and police institutions encouraged their 
members to commit or deterred their members from committing torture. According to the 
United Nations (1974), torture is defined as any act through which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by, or at the instigation of, a 
public official for such purposes as to obtain information or confession from the victim or a 
third party, to punish the victim for an act he has committed, or to intimidate him or other 
people. Torture is a systematic act that inflicts physical and psychological pain on victims 
who resist this aggression. In Chile, torture is an illegal action, and the law punishes 
individuals who perpetrate this type of crime (Código de Procedimiento Penal, 1906, 
art.323; Law 19696, 2000, art. 93 h)).  
The variables that are most commonly argued to explain this behavior are the military 
structure, principles, values and training practices (Graziano, 1992; Henníngs, Uribe y 
Guajardo, 1995; Kelman 1995; Baumeister, 1996; Payne, 1998; Conroy, 2000). Others 
studies show that the role of the institution appears to be the triggering factor, which 
promotes and supports the occurrence of torture. The common features are the training 
system, recruitment system, organizational structure, ideology, reward/punishment system, 
infrastructure facilities, hierarchical structure and command distribution (Haritos-Fatouros, 
2003; Huggins, & Haritos-Fatouros, 2014; Zimbardo, 2008). 
Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros (1986), Kelman and Hamilton (1989) describe torture as a 
crime of obedience in which a military system is structured in such a way that the subjects 
lose their capacity to discern between right and wrong and to follow orders without 
opposition. A crime of obedience is "an act performed in response to orders from an 
authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community‖ (p. 21). The 
authorities of the same state order, encourage, and/or tolerate systematic policies or 
sporadic acts of torture. This type of crime takes place within a hierarchical structure that 
makes it difficult to pinpoint the responsibility of specific individuals. Social influence, under 
these circumstances, results from the authority’s inducement for subordinates to change 
their behaviors, attitudes or beliefs. The important aspects to consider in the influence 
process are the influencing agent's characteristics, such as the agent's prestige, status, 
special knowledge or expertise, as well as the agent's control over certain resources, 
which enable the agent to apply sanctions.  
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People react to the authority system under which they are governed by submitting to the 
demands of the authority. Here, the individual aims to maintain his relationships with the 
group to which he is loyal and to define himself as a good group member. In this level of 
group identification, individuals cannot choose to disobey, because such action constitutes a 
violation to the norm of loyalty. Resistance becomes possible with an active redefinition of 
the situation, which, in most cases, does not happen, because authorities implement and 
reinforce penalties if individuals disobey them.  By contrast, positive reinforcements, such as 
medals or other awards, reinforce compliance (Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros, 1986; Kelman 
and Hamilton, 1989). Another factor that helps people to cross the line and commits acts of 
violence is an imposed system that keeps the perpetuators ignorant of what they are doing. 
In such a system, the instructions become clear only moments before the action is to be 
done, providing little time and opportunity for the order to be rejected. Another tactic is the 
use of a group of perpetrators. When "the perpetrator" is a group of individuals, opportunities 
for ambiguities to arise increase. With ambiguity, the perpetrator’s actions may have multiple 
meanings, making the individual uncertain about the correct one. Then, the responsibility for 
the actions can be divided among the individuals within the group so that no one person is to 
blame for the horrific acts. When individuals in a society commit criminal acts, they assume 
that they with be punished for their acts. However, with torture, perpetrators generally are not 
punished, and they may even be surprised by the lack of a condemnatory reaction 
(Baumeister, 1996).  This lack of punishment also facilitates perpetrators’ capacity to commit 
torture.  
Haritos-Fatouros (1988; 2003) examines the use of learning models based on principles of 
behavioral change in military training and identifies the following strategies: overlearning, in 
which establishing unquestioning obedience is the ultimate goal, so that recruits are 
prepared to carry out orders for acts of cruelty that have little meaning to them; 
desensitization, in which servicemen are gradually desensitized to the idea of torture in 
such a way that they can commit torture as if it was a normal act; role modeling, in which 
older servicemen flog and degrade new servicemen; and reinforcement, in which negative 
and positive reinforcement are used to maintain the torturers’ behavior. 
Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo  (2003) and Huggins & Haritos-Fatouros (2014) state 
that in-service training does not appear to be a single determining factor in producing serial 
perpetrators of atrocities. Instead, the police organization plays important role in  their 
socialization. Training was often given as reward after a good service, usually in association 
Reyes-Quilodran   /  Do institutions play a role in the perpetration of torture?         7 
 
Trabajo Social Global – Global Social Work,  Vol  8,  nº 15, julio-diciembre 2018,  3-25 
with a promotion to a more prestigious position. The researchers assume that the learning 
outcomes were derived primarily from on-duty and informal socialization. 
In Latin America, members of the military are strongly socialized within their profession. 
Training is used to keep the officers busy and to increase the effectiveness of the military 
force. Most Latin American countries teach officers military tactics, armed strategies, and 
broader matters of national importance in order to produce generals who are qualified for 
holding political leadership positions (Wesson, 1986), and the military actively participates in 
political matters (Skaar and Malca, 2014). 
During the 1960s, in Latin America, the military started to participate in political decision 
making.  As a result of this new approach, under the Security-Development ideology, 
strong central governments were created that were organized along military lines and fully 
controlled by the armed forces. The civil sectors demanded military intervention in 
economic and political affairs and, later, lost control over the military intervention (Wiarda & 
Collins, 2011). The National Security Doctrine defined targets who are enemies of the 
state as well as operative laws against the ―delinquent subversives‖ and against ―common 
delinquency‖ (Schirmer, 1998; Cottam, 1994). Kelman (1995) argues that the perceived 
threat to the security of the state provides a national policy that supports torture. Torture is 
justified to protect the state against internal and external threats to its security. 
Furthermore, in Chilean officer training programs, military soldiers are trained and socialized 
in isolation (Philip, 1985). The style of military training tends to create a psychological sense 
of distance between the military and civilians. Haritos-Fatouros (1988) and Creslisten 
(1995) argue that isolation during the military training aimed to create a sense of pride in 
belonging to a group of professionals, generating a gradual transition from the civilian world 
to the military. The military had its own selection system, ideological structure, and doctrine 
in which civilians were unable to interfere (Rouquié, 1987), and military intervention in 
political affairs was tolerated. 
The secrecy and insularity of the organizations that perpetuated torture shielded 
operatives from potentially dangerous outsiders, guaranteed operatives´ anonymity, 
disguised victims´ humanity, and morally disengaged operatives’ sense of responsibility 
for acts of violence (Huggins et al., 2003; McKelvey, 2007).  
Haritos-Fatouros (1988; 2003) and Creslisten (1995) note that specific police and military 
structures were created to torture, assassinate or kidnap victims. Each police and military 
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organization had specialized social control units and teams with their own internal division 
of labor. They had financial support as part of the institutional budget. The law also provided 
the military with legal entitlement to force compliance with the law, even to the point of 
physical injury or death, making the law part of the operations that provide security and 
peace. The military governments in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile passed self-
amnesty laws prior to transferring power to civilian authorities. These laws provided 
absolute legal impunity for the crimes that involved severe human rights violations 
(Zagorski, 1992). 
A code of honor, according to Dixon (1976), is a set of rules for expected behavior. These 
rules are relevant for followers because breaking them induces distressing emotions, such 
as guilt or shame. Feelings of guilt result from knowing that a member of the military 
institution has transgressed the code of honor and, hence, might be found out. Feelings of 
shame result from being found out (p. 197). Another function of military codes of honor is 
to reduce fear. García-Rivas (1984) reported in his testimonies that not only feelings of guilt 
and shame but also the fear of being punished for breaking the loyalty toward the institution 
influenced his participation in the military. The military discipline in South American 
countries as rigid and oriented toward indoctrinating young recruits with military values 
(Philip, 1985). One of these values is the acknowledgement that the high command 
defines the absolute law, not only within the institutional system, but also in recruits’ 
personal lives.  
In the manifestation of the power dynamic, three basic principles appear to be relevant: 
personal interest, enemy perception, and institutional support. Personal interest is 
established by the authoritarian structure of the military system in which social privileges 
are awarded to those with high positions in the military hierarchy. The enemy figure is 
identified as the individuals who simply disagree with the principles of the military or police. 
Institutional support provides the financial resources and rewards (Zagorski, 1997). This 
study examines the institutional features that influence the use of torture, focusing on the 
organizational structure of the institution and the perception of the individuals who 
perpetrated torture inside the system. 
Based on the theoretical approaches that are adopted in this study, this research identifies 
the following institutional influences: organizational structure, communication system and 
command distribution of the institution; institutional political interests; legal impunity of the 
torturers; linkage of the studied agency with other security services; infrastructure, facilities 
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and benefits of the institution; ideology and torture training practices of the institution; 
compliance with institutional orders; professionalization of torture; and use of isolation and 
institutional criteria for enrollment. 
1. Method  
The participants were inmates, who worked in the Chilean military and police institutions 
and units as intelligence agents where torture was carried out during the Chilean military 
regime. Chile appoints a prison solely for the purpose of imprisoning members of the military 
and police who were found guilty of murder and/or torture during the military regime. A letter 
describing the study and requesting their voluntary participation was sent to each inmate; 
six agreed to participate. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at 
Washington State University (05873-001). 
When the Chilean coup occurred in 1973, each branch of the armed forces and police (the 
carabineers and the investigative police) had an agency or division that was in charge of 
intelligence tasks. The six interviewees belonged to three intelligence agencies: the CNI 
(Central de Informaciones, National Center of Information, between 1977 to 1990), the 
DINE (Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército, Office of Intelligence of the Army) and the 
DICOMCAR (Dirección de Comunicaciones de Carabineros, Office of Communications of 
the Carabineers). The first two agencies were directly associated with different parts of 
the army, and the last one was associated with the police—the carabineers. All of these 
agencies perpetrated torture and homicides during the military regime. 
Several measurement approaches were used in this study. These consisted of conducting 
semi-structured interviews with inmates and reviewing National Reports and judicial files. 
Each interview took approximately two hours. The interviews followed a gradual process 
that permitted the interviewer to cover more complex issues, such as the perpetration of 
torture against their victims.  
Two State National Reports were analyzed: the National Report of the Committee of True 
and Reconciliation (NRCTR) (Rettig et. al., 1991) and the Report of the National 
Committee of Political Prison and Torture (NCPPT) (Valech et. al, 2004). Both reports 
describe the political violence and human rights violations that were perpetrated in Chile 
during the military regime. 
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Judicial files were reviewed to allow the researcher to identify the evidence that was 
presented during the judicial trials by the victims and offenders and to determine what 
arguments were used to avoid judicial punishment and what arguments were 
substantiated. The use of different data sources had the objective to compare the 
interviewees’ statements with the national reports and what they stated during the judicial 
process.  
The qualitative method used in this study allowed the researcher to discern the meaning of 
the data once complied in a dataset (Neuman, 2005). Because this is an exploratory 
study, data analysis was guided by the possibility of new and unexpected information. 
The length and number (five to seven) of interviews with each of the six subjects made it 
possible to achieve data saturation (Strauss and Corbin, 2002). The content of all the 
interviews and written documents was codified into concepts, which were used to create 
categories. The content analysis was in Paillé´s recommendations (2006). Relations within 
these categories were examined to achieve a central category based on theory. More 
specifically, the data were analyzed by using three different methods: successive 
approximation, analytic comparison, and agreement and difference (Neuman, 2005).  
 
2. Results and analysis of the results  
All interviewees were intelligence agents from the intelligence agencies of the army or 
police. To analyze the institution’s influence in the perpetration of torture, the features of 
each intelligence agency are examined, and the results are presented. 
 
2.1. Organizational structures and functions 
Participant 1 (P1) noted that the CNI units had the same organizational structure as the 
army. Each unit functioned under the orders of a division chief. Participant 2 (P2) said that 
the DINE was and is part to the army. As the army is a strongly disciplined and structured 
institution, it does not allow one to perform actions or make decisions without orders to do 
so from the high command or the authority in charge of a unit. The DINE was an 
intelligence agency that directly served the high command, and its offices were centralized 
in Santiago. Because of its centralized structure, agents could be mobilized to regions and 
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gather information at the local level with the support of the local army authorities. Like the 
CNI, the DICOMCAR had an intelligence unit, SICOMCAR, in each region, and all of these 
units were run by the Director of Carabineers, who was also a member of the Junta.  
Orders to investigate a case were provided by the Director of Carabineers and/or the 
Director of the DICOMCAR. 
 
2.2.  Communication system and command distribution   
The organizational structure of the CNI determined the forms of the communication 
between the high command, chiefs and subalterns, allowed the chiefs to monitor the 
subalterns’ activities, and determined whether information was disseminated up or down 
the organizational hierarchy. Orders were generally received and distributed downward. 
One of the differences between the army and the CNI was that information was generally 
compartmentalized. For example, members were unaware of the missions of other groups. 
The agents generally did not trust the rest of their colleagues or other people with whom 
they had relationships. They believed that a person, regardless of their intention, could 
repeat information to an inappropriate person, thereby informing the enemy and risking an 
operation. Participant 3 (P3) confirmed that the communication system was the same in CNI 
and DICOMCAR, as well as the use of ranks. Superiors always had the highest rank and 
more seniority than subalterns. This structure allowed superiors to distribute responsibilities 
and made subalterns not question orders. Keeping information compartmentalized also 
protected agents from punishment for the perpetration of crimes.  
P2 explained that the army had a regular procedure called daily reading, in which all the 
activities planned for a day are read. In the daily reading, the routine, actions and new 
assignments for the day are discussed. Each company uses its daily reading to inform 
each man of his own tasks as well as the company’s activities as a whole. In this structure, 
each group knows the nature of the order, but the way in which each level carries out its 
tasks and functions is not necessarily defined by the authorities.  
The Director of the Carabineers gave written orders by sending a memorandum F-L to the 
head of the DICOMCAR, who passed the order on to investigate someone. Like the other 
interviewees, P4 noted that not all of the orders were written; they were also verbal. 
Unfortunately, the archives were destroyed by fire when the DICOMCAR was questioned 
about the deaths of the left party´s members. 
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2.3. Institutional political interests 
Most of the CNI´s personnel only analyzed intelligence. The CNI´s actions were directed 
against the leftist groups and included infiltration, monitoring, arrests, torture, armed 
repression, and executions. Intimidation tactics aimed to disrupt organizations and 
movements and to intercept private communications between politicians, trade unions or 
church members. P1 believes that the authority used the CNI to thwart and even eliminate 
its political adversaries. The current judicial trials consider the DINE to be responsible for 
a number of assassinations, including assassinations of an ex-president, a labor union 
member, and important leaders of opposing political parties. The assassinations were 
selective and used methods that would conceal the crimes. The NCPPT Report confirms 
these facts. 
P3 and P4 noted that the DICOMCAR’s objectives were based on the needs of the 
authorities to investigate their enemies. P3 stated that, at the time, he did not consider 
himself to be fighting against political enemies; rather, he thought he was combating 
terrorism, which affected the entire nation and the Carabineers. The participants noted that 
the DICOMCAR submitted a report about matters of intelligence to the General Director of 
Carabineers and that this information was used in making political decisions. 
 
2.4. Legal impunity 
The CNI´s agents had absolute impunity, acting under false names, and they did not even 
reveal their identities in court during the judicial trial. They acted without being subject to 
rules, with unlimited power (Rettig et al., 199, p. 981). They had the power to arrest people 
(without a judicial order). P1 stated that he never thought that he could be judicially 
processed and condemned for his crimes. He always felt free of any judgment or sanctions. 
He explained that he received economic support from the army to travel to other countries 
and to stay there in order to avoid the judicial trial. This information is also confirmed in the 
judicial file.  
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Impunity was experienced in the daily lives of the criminals. According to the prosecutor’s 
allegations, provided in the judicial files, the army ascribed to the concept that the 
institution was responsible for keeping the traditional values of the nation. If this role was 
threatened by any one, the army members had the ability to use any form of violence in 
order to repress the offender, and they would not be questioned for doing so. 
The DICOMCAR’s agents never thought that they would be convicted of the crimes that 
they committed because the homicides were part of the violence perpetrated by the 
military regime. The work setting allowed them to use torture as a mechanism to obtain 
information. These agents were also removed from the DICOMCAR to avoid being 
identified in the judicial trial. 
 
2.5. Linkage of the CNI with other security services 
The CNI acted in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and intelligence 
agencies (Rettig et al., 1991). The intelligence agencies exchanged not only personnel 
and information but also conducted some activities together. The judicial files established 
that operations were led by the DINE but that agents from the CNI were appointed to the 
DINE to conduct homicides. Three interviewees worked in two different intelligence 
agencies. P4 explained that agencies also used counterintelligence. The DICOMCAR—
and other intelligence agencies—appointed its own agents in other agencies in order to 
obtain secret information from other agencies. Therefore, loyalty between the intelligence 
agencies was limited. In fact, the judicial files noted that one agency may have gathered 
information (even false information) in order to incriminate other agencies and accuse 
other agencies of crimes committed by its own personnel.  
 
2.6. Institutional infrastructure and facilities 
The funds were allocated by the Budget Law. The CNI could also acquire or receive 
resources from various sources, and nobody questioned the origin of these resources or 
audited the CNI. The National Director of the CNI had broad powers to manage the CNI’s 
properties and funds (Rettig, et al., 1991). In the judicial files, it was established that the 
CNI owned numerous businesses and that it had its own detention units. The methods of 
torture that were used by the CNI did not require substantial resources or funds to 
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implement; certain devices, such as electric apparatuses, that were used for torture were 
acquired by the agents. The access to administrative funds without the need to follow the 
rules of the bureaucratic state system not only provided the CNI with ample means of 
acquiring supplies but also led to opportunities for corruption because of the lack of 
monitoring (Valech, et al., 2004). 
The DINE had different departments that were in charge of providing support to various 
people. In the judicial files, it was noted that these departments provide agents with the 
equipment to perpetrate crimes. 
P3 stated that ―the DICOMCAR supplied all the equipment that was necessary to torture 
people, spy on them and keep archives of the victims’ information. This information was 
confirmed in the judicial files and the NCPPT Report. 
 
2.7. Benefits and motivations 
P1 and P6 noted that CNI members had salaries that were 30% higher than regular 
soldiers of the same rank. The Army gave P1 a soft loan to buy real estate. He was very 
careful about his personal image, and the job with the CNI allowed him to project an 
image of a strong man, like ―James Bond,‖ he stated. He could use special identification 
(similar to police identification) out on the street, which allowed him to avoid being 
questioned by law enforcement authorities. Moreover, he could use weapons and a car 
siren. Military members generally do not have these privileges. He led a group of men, 
and he had considerable power to make decisions and use different methods to 
investigate and interrogate prisoners.  
P2 explained, ―In the army, if you refuse to execute an order, then you are asked to go into 
retirement. When you are 40 years old and have exclusively been in the military and you 
do not have a profession that allows you to work in the civilian world, you follow orders to 
prevent you from being fired from the army and ensure that you keep your job.‖  During his 
military career, he became one of Pinochet’s most trusted men, and he was appointed to a 
high state position, which provided him with a good salary, social recognition, and power.  
P6 said that the job in the DICOMCAR gave him and his co-workers with benefits such as 
power, job security, relationships with people who had power and personal influence, 
prestige and a higher salary. To him, the intelligence agency protected him. He had 
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betrayed numerous members of his political party by denouncing, torturing and even killing 
them, so the political party was looking for him.  Moreover, he did not graduate from high 
school, and he had received training in espionage.  As a result, he could not find a well-
paying job, and the intelligence agencies gave him a job and the possibility of developing 
his knowledge and skills. 
According to P6, P4 was physically handicapped, and Carabineers did not require him to 
retire; instead, he was appointed to the DICOMCAR. This appointment made him feel 
committed to the institution, and he did not question orders from the high command to 
obtain its approval and to continue his career with the police. For P3, the agency allowed 
him to seek revenge upon guerrillas who had killed other Carabineers. P5 was able to 
buy three houses, which he would not have been able to do with a regular salary. 
Moreover, when he worked with the agency, he robbed the prisoners´ belongings. 
 
2.8. Institutional ideology and torture training practices 
P1 stated in 1973, he killed someone the first time. He did not express any emotional 
response or remorse for this act and showed a similar attitude toward other crimes. The 
military ideology generated in him the notion that he was a hero and that he was acting in 
the interests of the nation. In his training, the image of the enemy was presented 
frequently. The enemy was purported to have the capacity to destroy the country. 
According to P1, the anti-Marxist ideology was taught by the School of Americas. The 
training provided him with information about ―the dictatorship of the working class through 
the use of arms.‖ He also recognized that in the School in Panama, he learned torture 
techniques. Once the training concluded, he was in charge of teaching other military 
officers. The enemy, according to him, did not recognize the value of life, and if they did 
not kill the enemy, the enemy would kill them and destroy society. Therefore, when he 
participated in shooting civilians, he did not have any doubts about his actions.  
The training has two different dimensions: The first dimension refers to the military training 
of the army. The type of training that was used by the army desensitizes soldiers, making 
him more tolerant to violence.  However, it does not explain why some military soldiers did 
not perpetrate torture while others did. Here, the selection criteria of intelligence agencies 
for agents are relevant, which could require that an agent had specific traits. The second 
dimension refers to the training that is given by other institutions in matters of torture. 
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Training in torture involves not only learning the techniques for torturing subjects, but also 
defining the danger of the enemy.   
P2 did not admit to knowing the type of work done by the DINE and the CNI, which is 
impossible given to his position and his long career in the army. However, one observation 
from his interviews is his positive perception of the army.  
P6 enrolled in an intelligence unit of the left party, and he received training from the KGB 
services of the U.R.S.S. The Soviet intelligence training offered courses in interrogating 
and infiltrating military forces to make allies. He stated that the DICOMCAR´s members 
received training from Brazilian and Taiwan military officials and from the Army School in 
Chile. P5 received training from the CNI´s School in the ―Tres Alamos.‖ P4 received training 
on dealing with guerrilla groups and terrorism in Bolivia and Colombia. They used the 
Manual of Marijuela, which gave instruction on how to thwart and fight against guerilla 
groups. P3 stated that he received training from the School of Intelligence of the Chilean 
Army. He received training from the DINA (an old military intelligence agency) and Brazilian 
militaries, which were hired by the DINA. When he graduated from the Police Academy, he 
was exposed to violent murders, which gradually desensitized him to death. 
 
2.9. Compliance with institutional orders 
P1 openly admitted that he killed people and tortured captives. When the interviewer asked 
him why he committed these acts, he noted that he received orders from superiors to kill 
enemies of the state, and so, he did it. The same arguments were used by his defense 
lawyers in several judicial trials. From this point of view, he felt betrayed by the army 
because he followed orders, and thus, he should not be condemned for committing those 
actions by the courts. However, later, in a second interview, he stated that he did not feel 
betrayed by the army and that ―I did what I did it because I knew what I was doing‖. He 
stated that he never felt obligated to do what he did because he believed in the need to 
defend the nation from Marxism and from the guerrillas. These statements are clearly 
inconsistent. He never felt that his life or the lives of his family would be threatened if he left 
the CNI or if he refused to do a ―task.‖ He stated that no one was forced to work in the CNI. 
He worked in the CNI because he liked the job. P1 voluntarily committed homicide and was 
aware of the magnitude of the crime, as noted in his statements in the judicial files and in his 
interview. His defense attorney asked for his charges to be dismissed, arguing that he 
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followed military orders and that he was unable to disobey Código de Justicia Militar (1944, 
art. 344 and 355). Nevertheless, the judge indicated that the order should be based on 
military needs and that it was not. 
P2 was found guilty of being responsible for giving the order to kill a civilian. Although he 
did not acknowledge giving this order, but his involvement in the murder was proved in the 
judicial trial. He argued that he did not know of the actions of his subalterns, even though 
he explained in detail that such a lack of knowledge was impossible in the army system.  
P6 noted that his police training made follow orders feel natural. Following orders was part of 
the daily routine since they were enrolled in the academy. P3 stated that orders were given 
and that his duty was to obey them. Nevertheless, he did not follow orders merely because 
the authority gave them or because he was afraid of punishment. Instead, he followed 
orders because he strongly believed that the orders were correct and facilitated the fight 
against the enemy. P4 stated that the orders were usually verbal and ambiguous, but in 
some cases, the orders were given to him directly from the DICOMCAR’s director and via a 
written memorandum.  
 
2.10. Professionalization of torture 
P1 saw torture as a tool that was needed to obtain information as fast as possible but that 
also allowed them to physically and mentally handicap the enemy so that they could not 
fight back and show their scares the other guerrillas. The torture sessions were structured, 
and they looked for specific information. According to him, two forms of torture exist: 
professional torture and unprofessional torture. In professional torture, excesses were not 
allowed, because people received training to obtain information. In unprofessional torture, 
the perpetrator lacked self-control and he ultimately killed the person being tortured. 
During acts of torture, it was easy for someone to lose control, and such behavior was not 
punished. 
Even though torture training provided trainees with torture techniques, torture was 
implemented differently by different agents. Crimes perpetrated to eliminate threats to the 
military regime were highly organized within the DINE. For the Carabineers, torture was a 
professional tool that was used to obtain confessions from delinquents. Moreover, torture 
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was used to obtain information for guerrilla groups, to identify other guerrillas and to prevent 
terrorist attacks. 
2.11. Isolation 
P1 perceived himself to be isolated from the civilian world. His close friends belonged to 
the CNI or the army. Therefore, the people that were close to him either implicitly or 
explicitly agreed with his behavior. Although the army did not prohibit its members from 
having relationships with civilians, he felt close to the other members of the military. 
P2 was immersed in the army. His referent group was the army and its members, and his 
social life was contained within the military system. He described the role of the wife of an 
army official, and in this description, it can be observed that the military system crossed 
the family sphere. Even though the Carabineers are closer to civil society than the 
military is, members of the DICOMCAR spent long periods of time with their workmates. 
Operations required that they spend many hours in cars watching guerrillas’ activities, 
and the job did not follow a regular schedule. As a result, they developed close 
relationships, went out together and shared family activities. They believed that the 
characteristics of their job brought them closer together and distanced them from the 
general society. 
 
2.12. Institutional criteria for enrollment 
According to the interviewees, the most qualified military men enrolled in the CNI. 
However, in fact, the best military officers were those who were most indoctrinated by the 
army, who did not question orders, who were disciplined, and who believed in the army’s 
statements about the enemy. P1 stated that the CNI asked the police institutions to send 
them recruits, which is corroborated by the NCPPT Report. The interviewees explained 
that policemen had the most knowledge of torture techniques because they used torture 
techniques to interrogate regular criminals. The police and the other armed forces selected 
the men who would be enrolled in the CNI. P3 stated that the police generally selected the 
worst candidates, because they saw the new assignment as an opportunity to remove the 
worst officials from the institution. P 3, P4 and P6 noted that the enrollment criteria for 
intelligence agencies included previous experience with torturing individuals, adoption of 
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the Anti-Marxist political ideology, a motivation to participate in risky activities, the capacity 
to remember information, and a high level of commitment to the police. 
 
3. Discussion   
The intelligence agencies in Chile shared a common organizational structure. They were 
headed by a leader, who had highest rank and more seniority than subordinates. The 
structure defined who was responsible for giving orders and who followed orders.  
The CNI and the DICOMCAR had diverse agencies at the regional level, and these 
agencies were commanded and supervised by the agency´s head. This organizational 
system allowed the agencies’ authorities to have control at the regional level. The most 
relevant aspect of this structure was the communication system, which facilitated the 
dissemination of information up and down the hierarchy. The authorities gave orders to the 
subordinates, but at the same time, the subordinates had to inform the authorities of their 
activities. These intelligence agencies gathered information about not only the political 
adversaries of the military regime but also the people who worked in these agencies, 
allowing the authorities to control both the agencies´ members and the political opposition. 
The communication system allowed information to be disseminated rapidly and easily. All 
the agencies compartmentalized information to reduce the possibility of an operation or 
mission being jeopardized by an enemy. With this system, a group of individuals could 
perpetrate crimes without knowledge of the rest of the agents. 
Daily readings that were used by the army were also utilized by the DINE. Daily readings 
allowed each member to know the planned activities and to report the results of these 
activities. Even though the other intelligence agencies did not identify ―the daily reading‖ as 
an activity that was implemented for them, they used a very similar system to inform the 
authorities of the activities that were developed for each agent in relation to a given 
mission. In the communication system that was implemented, the leader of each group 
and the intelligence agency were the most informed entities, and they knew the types of 
activities that were carried out by their subordinates.  
They always felt free of any judgment or sanctions, and by contrast, they received 
rewards from the authorities for their actions.  Legal impunity was experienced in the daily 
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lives of the interviewees, and the people who were called upon to condemn such crimes 
justified and supported them.  
The intelligence agencies were linked to each other through their aim to gather information 
about the adversaries of the military regime. These linkages were absolutely functional; the 
agencies were not loyal to each other. In contrast, the intelligence agencies gathered 
information about the criminal acts that were committed by other agencies to incriminate 
them in the judicial trials. 
All the intelligence agencies had a designated a budget and a detention unit, which was 
designed to detain people. The equipment and infrastructure that were required for torturing 
individuals were financed by the police or the army. 
The subjects believed that the person who was being tortured represented a threat and 
deserved to be killed or tortured. If the enemy represents a tremendous danger, s/he was 
removed of his/her humanity. The army as well as police embraced the National Security 
Doctrine, which established that subjects who endorsed the Marxist ideology or who were 
against the military regime were enemies of the state. The National Security Doctrine 
argued that the enemy was hidden to the civilians; therefore, anyone could be the enemy, 
which explains why they tortured and mistreated innocent people.  
The military are trained to fight back against enemies, and this training was coupled with 
the attributes that were given to the enemy. Regardless of whether enemy’s ascribed 
attributes were based on fact, the main point was that the enemy posed a threat to society 
and the lives of those who were fighting against them.  The mission of the police is similar. 
That is, the police fight against criminals, who are the enemy. The institution offered them 
the structure and ideology to fight against someone. Therefore, it was not difficult to 
introduce the image of the enemy, in this case leftist party members and guerrillas, to 
them. One of the interviewed policemen explained that he was trained to fight a war and 
that he did not understand why the civilians complained of the methods that he used, 
because he was trained to use these methods. 
The perception of the danger of Marxist as an enemy was created in the training and 
reinforced by peers. The training for Carabineers and army soldiers made them 
unquestioningly follow orders. Therefore, when a superior gave an order, their duty was to 
obey it. Nevertheless, three of the interviewees did not follow orders to obey the authority 
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or to avoid punishment. Instead, they followed orders because they strongly believed that 
the orders were correct responses in the fight against the enemy. 
Torture was regarded as a tool that was needed to obtain information as quickly as 
possible. Therefore, torture was the method that was used to achieve this goal, but they 
also wanted to physically and mentally destroy the enemy by using torture. The degree of 
organization and the divisions of tasks in operations indicate that torture was not a new 
activity for the agencies. Furthermore, the crimes were highly organized and perpetrated in 
the context of professional work. 
The theory that the crimes were crimes of obedience does not hold. On the one hand, 
some interviewees claimed that they were following orders; on the other hand, they 
acknowledged feeling gratified by their job and voluntarily joining the intelligence agencies. 
When they are asked whether they were able to refuse orders, they claimed that they could 
refuse to commit a crime and that they did what they did because they believed that they 
were doing the right thing. The crimes are argued to be crimes of obedience by the lawyers 
of the accused in the judicial trials to reduce their responsibility in the crimes.  
The interviewees and the interviewed victims’ lawyers did not report that dissidents of the 
institutions´ ideology and the ―procedures‖ of the intelligence agency were murdered. 
Instead, the dissidents may not have been appointed to high positions or may not have 
had a successful career.  One of the victims’ lawyers explained that during the military 
regime, dissenting military soldiers or policemen may have been separated from the 
institution or murdered, and this fact may have created a myth about what happened to the 
dissidents of the military regime.  
The agents admitted that their jobs in these agencies required that they spend time away 
from their homes and that they spend a considerable amount of time with other agents. 
Thus, they were isolated from the civilian world and established close relationships with 
other agents within the same unit. This isolation limited their ability to relate to other social 
groups, which could give them another point of view regarding their actions. 
The institutional criteria and age for enrolling agents were not very precise. However, most 
of the interviewees noted that candidates were required to share the anti-Marxist 
ideology, to assume risky behavior and to be able to commit illegal acts.  
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Conclusion 
One of the most important contributions of this study is that it allows one to visualize the 
institutional elements that are present in the perpetration of torture by state agents. When 
we talk about prevention in the manifestation of torture, we need to know its origin, and how 
through the institutional role we can prevent its occurrence. This was the first empirical 
study conducted in Chile, which permits us to observe the different aspects presented in 
the human rights violations to have a better comprehension of this phenomenon and help 
other nations to prevent it. Carver and Handely (2017) argue that torture is an act that can 
be prevented if detention practices are modified within an institutional context. In the 
practice of social work, we have worked with the victims and perpetrators of human rights, 
and in these experiences many times the victims wonder why so much horror. This study 
helps to understand this type of crime and how it can be definitively stopped as well as the 
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